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Introduction
This paper analyzes the strategic use of bilateral supply contracts in sequential negotiations between one manufacturer and two differentiated retailers. Allowing for general contracts and retail bargaining power, I show that the first contracting parties have incentives to manipulate their contract to shift rent from the second contracting retailer and these incentives distort the industry profit away from the fully integrated monopoly outcome. To avoid such distortion, they may prefer to sign a contract which has no commitment power and can be renegotiated from scratch should the manufacturer fail in its subsequent negotiation with the second retailer. A non-binding contract induces the first contracting parties to implement the monopoly prices and might enable them to capture the maximum industry profit.
It is well documented that vertically related firms cannot coordinate competing retailers' pricing decisions through their bilateral supply contracts. 1 Arms-length vertical contracting therefore results in competitive retail prices which are lower than the ones set by a fully integrated monopoly firm. My paper contributes to this literature by illustrating the role of supply contracts with no commitment power (that is, allowing for renegotiation from scratch) in internalizing contracting externalities and enabling the firms to implement the monopoly outcome, which I refer to as the "efficient outcome".
The focus of this paper is on rent shifting (that is, how the firstly negotiating parties should design their contract to extract as much surplus as possible from the second retailer).
The previous literature on bilateral contracting seems to imply that a commitment not to renegotiate is key to extracting rent from the third parties. 2 In this paper, to the contrary, renegotiation from scratch may be desirable. The reason is that otherwise the first contracting retailer and manufacturer have an incentive to distort the outcome away from the industry profit maximizing outcome in order to shift more rent from the second contracting retailer. There is no deviation from the efficiency if the first retailer and manufacturer can commit to renegotiate from scratch in case the second retailer has no agreement with the manufacturer. Intuitively, such a renegotiation clause makes the manufacturer's outside option with the second retailer independent of the firstly signed contract and thereby induces the first contracting parties to set their contract terms in order to maximize the industry profit. As a result, the firms could achieve the monopoly outcome. If the renegotiation is not from scratch, but from status quo determined by the firstly signed contract, the commitment strategic effects of the first contract are still present and lead to the same inefficient equilibrium outcome as the game without renegotiation.
I model the sequential bilateral negotiations as a three-stage game assuming first an exogenous (fixed) order of negotiations. 3 In stage 1, the manufacturer and the first retailer negotiate a contract. In stage 2, the manufacturer and the second retailer negotiate a contract.
In stage 3, retailers with signed contracts compete in the product market. In addition, there are three key features of the model: (i) signed contract terms are observable to all parties at the start of the following stage, (ii) contracts include an up-front fee to be paid at the time the contract is signed and a tariff as a function of quantity purchased and to be paid when the trade takes place, and (iii) retailers have some bargaining power.
In this setup, I distinguish two factors leading to the firms' failure to maximize the industry profit. The first is the well-known opportunism problem of the monopoly manufacturer Hart and Tirole (1990) , O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) , McAfee and Schwartz (1994) . After signing a contract with the first retailer, the manufacturer cannot commit to not giving a better deal and selling more to the second retailer. This opportunism problem can be solved by rich enough supply contracts Miklós-Thal et al. (2010) . 4 For instance, if the first retailer gets its equilibrium profit up-front by a slotting fee paid by the manufacturer and agrees to give all of its anticipated revenue (at monopoly prices) as a "conditional tariff" after observing its rival's quantity, 5 the manufacturer would then sell exactly the monopoly quantity to the rival retailer, since if it sells more than that, the first retailer would not trade to avoid paying a tariff above its realized revenue. 6 The second factor leading to the inefficient outcome is the commitment strategic effect of the first contract on the continuation of the game. It arises because the second contracting retailer has some bargaining power and the firstly contracting parties use their contract to manipulate the manufacturer's outside option in the second negotiation, and thereby to shift rent from the second retailer. I show that the general supply tariffs do not suffice to fix the second problem, 7 and so the firms fail to achieve the efficient outcome. However, if the first 3 I relax this assumption later by endogenizing the order. 4 Two-part tariffs combined with retail price maintenance (RPM) would also solve the opportunism problem O' Brien and Shaffer (1992) . However, RPM is forbidden in almost all OECD countries OECD (1997). Alternatively, supply contracts contingent on the rival retailers' contracts (or simply on their quantities) would also solve the problem, but these contracts are difficult to reinforce since they are mostly outlawed by anti-trust authorities.
5 This role of conditional fees is first illustrated by de Fontenay and Gans (2005) where the retailers do not have any bargaining power, so slotting fees are not used to solve the opportunism problem. Marx and Shaffer (2007b) and Miklós-Thal et al. (2010) instead give all bargaining power to the retailers and show that conditional tariffs combined with slotting fees solve the opportunism problem.
6 Conditional tariffs work in a similar way to liquidated damages studied by Aghion and Bolton (1987) : If the manufacturer sells more to the second retailer, it is punished by the loss of a substantial revenue since by a high enough conditional tariff the first retailer commits to opting out in case its rival sells more than expected.
7 Supply contracts contingent on the rival retailers' contracts or simply on its existence Mikls et al. (2010) would also solve the problem. But, again, these types of contingent contracts are under the scrutiny of anti-trust authorities since they are regarded as horizontal cooperative contracts.
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bilateral contract is non-binding in the event of a breakdown of the second negotiation, the first contract has no effect on the manufacturer's outside option in the second negotiation and therefore the first contracting parties' bilateral incentives coincide with maximizing the industry profit.
The first retailer and manufacturer prefer their contract to have no commitment power if they could maximize their (ex-post) bilateral profits by committing (ex-ante) to renegotiate from scratch in the event that the second retailer has a disagreement with the manufacturer. This is shown to be the case when rent shifting incentives are very high, for example if the second retailer has very high bargaining power or if the first retailer is very profitable in exclusive dealing or if the retailers are sufficiently differentiated.
My contractual framework with no commitment power is the same as the non-binding contracts of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and de Fontenay and Gans (2007) , 8 and is motivated in several ways. First, it captures a vertical environment where supply contracts have no commitment power and a pairwise renegotiation could be started by one of the two parties anytime before retail competition takes place. 9 Second, in practice contracts are often renegotiated or no longer valid in the event of a material change of circumstances. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that a contract signed by one retailer has no commitment power should the conditions of the contracting change radically by the absence of a rival retailer. Moreover, I show that the first contracting parties prefer their contract to have no commitment power under a large set of parameter values. These results are robust to different types of retail competition (e.g., price vs quantity competition) and to allowing renegotiation from scratch of the first agreement also in case the second negotiation succeeds. The order of the sequential negotiations, the level of asymmetry between the retailers in terms of their bargaining power vis-à-vis the manufacturer or their profitability in exclusive dealing, do not affect the equilibrium quantities, which are always at the monopoly level, and affects only the distribution of the monopoly profits. The manufacturer prefers to negotiate first with the less powerful retailer, with which it has the larger disagreement payoff 10 since, by this way, it could use its first agreement as a tool to capture more rent from the more powerful retailer. 11 8 The first paper models sequential intra-firm wage bargaining between the firm and its employees, and is interested in whether the firm's equilibrium choice for the number of employees or for the technology of production are efficient. The second paper models sequential bilateral bargaining of a quantity and tariff between many sellers and many buyers with asymmetric information (as contract terms are not observable to third parties) and passive beliefs. It shows that the equilibrium outcome is bilaterally efficient, but fails to maximize the total surplus of all players.
9 As shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, Theorem 2) . 10 In this paper, the power of a retailer is captured by two parameters, the retailer's bargaining power and its profitability in exclusive dealing with the manufacturer.
11 This result is in line with Marx and Shaffer (2007a) who consider sequential bilateral negotiations between two sellers and one buyer and show that the buyer prefers to start negotiations with the weak seller to capture more rent from the strong seller.
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My analyses have some testable implications. I show that the supplier of competing retailers prefers to start negotiations with the weak retailer, with which it earns a lower profit in exclusive dealing, that is the less efficient retailer and/or the one with a lower bargaining power. If the second contracting retailer has a very high bargaining power or the first retailer is very weak or the retailers are very differentiated, the manufacturer signs a contract without commitment power with the weak retailer.
Some evidence from the UK grocery market supports these findings. The interviews conducted with grocery suppliers in the UK illustrate that the supply contracts of the less powerful retailers (chain stores) are renegotiated much more frequently (sometimes on a daily basis), that is, they have much less commitment power than the supply contracts of more powerful retailers (four largest supermarkets) and "overall, the majority of suppliers claimed to be satisfied with the frequency of price and volume negotiations." 12
The next section describes the main framework. Section 3 compares the equilibrium outcomes of the three versions of my contracting setup; without renegotiation, with renegotiation from scratch, and with renegotiation but not from scratch, and analyzes the preferences of the first contracting parties over the commitment power of their contract. Section 4 discusses whether negative payments are necessary tools. Section 5 presents the extensions of the main framework. Finally, Section 6 concludes with policy implications. All formal proofs are in the Appendix, where I also characterize the equilibrium outcome of the game without renegotiation and describe conditions under which one retailer is excluded.
Framework
Consider a market where one manufacturer, U , negotiates bilateral supply contracts with two differentiated retailers, D 1 and D 2 , for the distribution of its product. 13 Since the evolution of one negotiation with a retailer directly affects the payoff of the other retailer, that is, there are contracting externalities, not only the manufacturer but also the retailers are aware of strategic play of the manufacturer dealing with competing retailers. To take this fact into account in a tractable setup, I consider sequential (bilateral) negotiations and assume that the outcome of each negotiation is publicly observed before the subsequent negotiation starts. 14 I assume that the manufacturer's production takes place after contract negotiations 12 See Competition Commission (2007), p. 32-41. 13 I suppose that Di does not hold any inventory and re-sells all quantity purchased from U . 14 If I assumed secret contracts, I would have to make an assumption on out of equilibrium beliefs of retailers. The most widely used assumption (due to its tractability) is passive beliefs McAfee and Schwartz (1994) , which means that when the retailers receive an unexpected offer from the manufacturer, they believe that the manufacturer keeps its offer with the rival retailer unchanged, i.e., the retailers believe that the manufacturer is not fully strategic. See de Fontenay and Gans (2007) Binmore et al. (1986) show that this axiomatic solution emerges as the outcome of an alternating-offer extensive form game. 19 To simplify the analysis, I
assume that after a failure of a negotiation round with one retailer, the manufacturer does not negotiate again with that retailer before retail competition takes place. 20
The supply contract between U and D i is a general contract The manufacturer has a constant production cost, c, the retailers incur the costs of purchasing inputs from U and, for simplicity, I assume that they have no additional costs from their activity. 25 I do not specify the type of competition between the retailers; in particular, the results are valid both for quantity and price competition.
denote D i 's revenue when it sells q i units and its rival sells q −i units. The profits of D i , U , and the industry are denoted, respectively, by π i , π U , and Π :
I assume that each retailer's revenue is increasing in its own quantity and decreasing in its rival's quantity, respectively: 26
Moreover, the following assumptions ensure the second-order conditions:
21 I will show that in equilibrium S1 is negative as long as D1 has some bargaining power, so S1 is indeed a slotting fee paid by U to D1.
22 Contract space is restricted in the sense that a retailer's contract cannot depend on its rival's contract. This assumption is motivated by the fact that contracts contingent on rivals' actions are difficult to enforce since they are regarded as horizontal cooperative agreements between competitors and therefore, are mostly outlawed by anti-trust authorities, at least in Europe and in the US. In the extension section, I will discuss how allowing contracts to be contingent on the market structure would change the results.
23 This technical assumption is necessary to outlaw contract spaces in which there exists no best-response quantity by a retailer to a given tariff and its rival's quantity. For instance, consider the subgame where the first negotiation fails. If the second negotiation signs contract T2 = 0 f or q2 ≤ 1 1 f or q2 > 1 , retailer 2 wants to buy a quantity very close to 1, so there exists no best-response quantity to this contract. I thank Paul Heidheus for pointing this out. 24 For instance, more general than linear prices (a unit price per unit), quantity fixing contracts (one tariff for one quantity), two-part tariffs (a unit price per quantity and a fixed fee), three-part tariffs (an up-front fee to be paid at the signature of the contract and a two-part tariff to be paid when trade occurs).
25 The qualitative analysis would remain valid if I assumed that U had a convex cost function and/or the retailers incurred some additional retailing costs.
26 To simplify the expressions, I denote all partial derivatives by ∂. For example, ∂X Y refers to the first-order derivative of variable Y with respect to variable X, and ∂ 2 XZ Y refers to the second-order derivative of Y with respect to X and Z, and so on.
denote the "monopoly" quantities which maximize the industry profit and Π M denote the maximum industry profit, which I refer to as "vertically integrated monopoly profit" or "monopoly profit". 27 The monopoly quantities serve as a benchmark against which contracting outcomes are compared, and the firms' failure to maximize their joint profit will be referred to as "inefficiency". 28 If D i is the unique active retailer, q m i denotes the quantity maximizing the industry profit and the maximized industry profit is denoted by Π m i . I allow the retailers to be asymmetric in their profitability when exclusive dealing, Π m 1 = Π m 2 , which I refer to as the retailers being different in their "efficiency". 29
Assumption A1(ii), rules out an uninteresting case where two retail markets are independent 30 and implies that
Moreover, I assume that the maximum industry profit is higher when both retailers are active rather than when there is an exclusive deal with one retailer:
I use sequential negotiations mainly to study the role of renegotiation on internalizing contracting externalities. I consider three different scenarios regarding the commitment power of the firstly signed contract:
• full commitment, which refers to the original game (without renegotiation),
• no commitment, which refers to the game where the first contracting parties renegotiate their contract from scratch in the event of the second retailer having no agreement, that is, there is a renegotiation stage after Stage 2 before Stage 3, 27 Existence and uniqueness of (q
2 ) are guaranteed by A2. They are formally defined as
and the industry profit at these quantities is denoted by
. 28 Regarding the total welfare or consumer welfare, this notion of efficiency does not have any normative meaning.
29 This might be, for example, because one retailer has a lower demand (or a higher cost in case we introduce positive distribution costs) than the other retailer.
30 In this case, there would be no externality between the retailers, and a two-part tariff contract with a wholesale price at the marginal cost of the manufacturer would be sufficient to implement the vertically integrated monopoly outcome.
31 If the retailers were perfect substitutes, the manufacturer would prefer to deal exclusively with the most profitable retailer in equilibrium.
• partial commitment, which refers to the game with renegotiation of the first contract, but not from scratch, in the event of the second retailer having no agreement (after Stage 2 before Stage 3).
I look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by solving the sequential game backwards for each commitment framework. At the end I compare the bilateral profits of the first retailer and manufacturer in equilibrium of the three commitment scenarios and illustrate their bilateral preference for the commitment power of their firstly signed contract.
Equilibrium analysis
For (sub-game) equilibrium contracts, quantities, prices and profits, I use superscript * * if both retailers are active, and the superscript * when there is only one active retailer.
Moreover, π * i U denotes U 's equilibrium profit from exclusive dealing with D i . The sub-game equilibrium analyses of Stage 3 (retail equilibrium) and the case where the first retailer and manufacturer have no agreement (exclusive dealing with the second retailer), are the same for the three commitment frameworks, so I describe their analyses only once:
Retail Equilibrium Each downstream firm which has signed a supply contract with U , say D i , sets its best-response quantity to its rival's quantity by maximizing its variable profit:
(1)
The contract space I consider ensures the existence of a unique best-response to given q −i ≥ 0.
Depending on the signed supply contracts, there are two types of retail equilibrium:
exclusive dealing and retail competition. If D i is the only retailer that has signed a contract with U , D i becomes the exclusive dealer and sells q * i = q BR i (0). If both retailers have signed a supply contract with U , the solution to the retailers' best-response quantities determine the Nash equilibrium, q * * i = q BR i (q BR −i (q i )). Both retailers are active if and only if condition (2) holds for both i = 1, 2.
Exclusive Dealing with the Second Retailer In case of a disagreement between U and D 1 in the first stage, U and D 2 sign a contract as long as each of them earns non-negative profits, which is the case when the gains from trade are non-negative. Here, the gains from trade are equal to the industry profit since D 2 's and U 's outside options are both zero. 32
Since T 2 (q) allows U and D 2 to share the industry profit through a fixed transfer, they want to implement q m 2 to maximize the total share of the pie. This gives us the following result:
Lemma 1 If U and D 1 have no agreement, in a sub-game equilibrium, D 2 sells q m 2 and the resulting profits of D 2 and U are, respectively,
One tariff-quantity pair (t * 2 , q * 2 ) such that t * 2 = (1 − λ 2 )Π m 2 + cq m 2 and q * 2 = q m 2 , is sufficient to implement this outcome.
Observe that whether the tariff is paid upfront, before the actual trade, or ex-post, when the trade takes place, is not important to implement this outcome, since its unique role is to share profits.
Full commitment benchmark: contracts without renegotiation
In the benchmark, I consider the sequential contracting game without renegotiation. When renegotiation is not allowed, the contract signed by U and D 1 in Stage 1, T 1 , is implemented even in the event of D 2 having no agreement with U . Hence, U 's disagreement payoff with D 2 depends on the first contract signed with D 1 and is equal to the profit of U (under T 1 ) when dealing exclusively with D 1 , which is
where q * 1 refers to the sub-game equilibrium quantity purchased by D 1 and characterized by the retail equilibrium condition, (1), for i = 1 and q 2 = 0.
If U and D 2 sign a contract, their bilateral profit would be
They agree on a contract if there are some gains from trade, that is, the maximum value of the bilateral profits from trading is higher than the manufacturer's outside option:
In this case, through a fixed fee, U and D 2 share the gains from trade with respect to their 32 Recall that U cannot negotiate with D1 another time once there is a disagreement between them.
11 relative bargaining power: 33
and set t 2 (.) to implement the quantity maximizing their bilateral profit (3).
Anticipating the equilibrium of the second stage contracting, if U and D 1 sign a contract, their bilateral profit would be (replacing π 2 by its equilibrium value from (5))
They agree on a contract if their maximum bilateral profit from this trade is higher than what the manufacturer would get if they had no agreement (see Lemma 1):
If this is the case, through a fixed fee, U and D 1 share the gains from trade with respect to their relative bargaining power:
and set t 1 (.) to maximize their bilateral profit (6).
When choosing an optimal tariff, U and D 1 face a trade-off. On one hand, they want to induce the efficient outcome, (q M 1 , q M 2 ), to maximize the total industry profit, Π(q 1 , q 2 ). To do so, they need to set
, since otherwise U and D 2 would trade a quantity greater than q M 2 (by using equation (3)):
However, if D 1 agrees to give all of its anticipated revenue as a conditional fee after observing its rival's quantity, the manufacturer and the second retailer do not have an incentive to trade a quantity greater than q M 1 , since otherwise the first retailer would not buy a positive quantity to avoid paying a tariff higher than its revenue. In other words, setting the first retailer's conditional tariff at its anticipated revenue protects it against the opportunistic behavior of the second contracting parties. 34 The first retailer wants to give all of its revenue as a conditional fee only if there is another tool through which the retailer could get its share over the gains from trade. An up-front payment made by the manufacturer to the first retailer, S 1 < 0, would serve as such a tool. 35 On the other hand, when the second retailer has some bargaining power, λ 2 > 0, U and D 1 want to minimize the rent of D 2 by maximizing U 's outside option with D 2 , t 1 (q * 1 ) − cq * 1 , and the latter is maximized at t 1 (q * 1 ) = R 1 (q * 1 , 0) and q * 1 = q m 1 . Suppose that U and D 1 set their contract to induce the efficient outcome:
In the case of D 2 having no agreement with U , D 1 should sell q * 1 (by definition of q * 1 ), so as to earn at least as much as selling q M 1 :
which imposes an upper bound on the exclusive dealing tariff:
Since the bilateral profit of U and D 1 , (6), increases in t 1 (q * 1 ), the latter constraint should be binding in equilibrium. Their bilateral profit then increases in the exclusive dealing industry profit, Π(q * 1 , 0), so, should D 2 have no agreement, U and D 1 should set q * 1 = q m 1 and
Their bilateral profit at the efficient outcome would therefore be
This shows that starting from (q M 1 , q M 2 ), U and D 1 have a profitable deviation if and only if
which is the case whenever the second retailer has some bargaining power, λ 2 > 0, since the retailers are competing and their marginal revenue is affected by the rival's sales:
If the marginal revenue of one retailer is increasing in the quantity of its rival, that is, if ∂ 2 q i q −i R i (q i , q −i ) > 0, the quantities are strategic complements, and therefore U and D 1 prefer to trade more than q M 1 to increase U 's outside option with D 2 . But then U and D 2 would also trade more than q M 2 to maximize their bilateral profit, (3). Otherwise, that is, if ∂ 2 q i q −i R i (q i , q −i ) < 0, the quantities are strategic substitutes and the retailers sell less than q M 1 and q M 2 , respectively. The proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1 When the second contracting retailer has some bargaining power, λ 2 > 0, in equilibrium of the game without renegotiation, the firms fail to implement the vertically integrated monopoly quantities. The equilibrium quantities are above their monopoly level,
The proposition shows that protecting the first retailer against the opportunism of the manufacturer is not enough to achieve the efficient outcome, since U and tariff and a negative up-front fee in the first contract). However, a new finding is that, even with the general contracts, they cannot correct the latter externality, which arises due to the commitment strategic effects of the first contract on the manufacturer's outside option with the second retailer. 37
The failure to achieve the efficient outcome might lead to the exclusion of the second retailer or a disagreement between U and D 1 . The first contracting parties prefer to exclude the second retailer if and only if from exclusive dealing they earn more than their joint profit if retailer 2 is also active and more than their disagreement joint payoff (given by Lemma 1), 36 See, for example, Hart and Tirole (1990) , O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) , McAfee and Schwartz (1994) , Segal (1999) , Segal and Whinston (2003) , Martimort and Stole (2003) , Marx and Shaffer (2007b) .
37 This externality would be internalized and the efficient outcome would be implemented if it was the manufacturer who determined the quantity (or price) of the first retailer (such as retail price maintenance) after signing the contract. For instance, recent work by Rey and Whinston (2011) show the existence of the monopoly outcome in a setup where the retailers have all the bargaining power and offer simultaneously menus of contracts to the manufacturer, which in turn picks one contract within the offer of each retailer or none. respectively,
For instance, when the second retailer's bargaining power is very high, at the limit when λ 2 goes to 1, the first contracting parties prefer to exclude the second retailer, since ∂ q 2 R 1 (q 1 , q 2 ) < 0. On the other hand, when the second retailer has nearly no bargaining power, when λ 2 goes to 0, the equilibrium quantities approach to their efficient levels (as shown by Proposition 1 The manufacturer would therefore prefer to exclude the second retailer when the latter has too high bargaining power (even if it is more efficient than the first retailer), otherwise the manufacturer would be strictly better off from dealing with both retailers in equilibrium.
No commitment: contracts with renegotiation from scratch
In case of a disagreement between U and D 2 , previously signed T 1 becomes null, and U 
One tariff-quantity pair (t * 1 , q * 1 ) such that t * 1 = (1 − λ 1 )Π m 1 + cq m 1 and q * 1 = q m 1 , is sufficient to implement this outcome.
The lemma shows that U 's disagreement payoff with D 2 is now equal to
which does not depend on the first contract signed with D 1 . Different from the benchmark, here the first contract cannot be used as a way to influence U 's outside option in the second negotiation since in the event of a disagreement between U and D 2 , the first contract becomes null; U and D 1 renegotiate from scratch, as a result of which the manufacturer gets (1−λ 1 )Π m 1 . To take into account this difference in the solution of the game, it is enough to replace (7), and changes the equilibrium profits of U and D 1 , given in (6). Now, the bilateral profit of U and D 1 is
If U and D 1 set t 1 (q 1 ) = R 1 (q 1 , q 2 ), by adjusting S 1 appropriately, they always internalize a fixed share, (1 − λ 2 ), of any increase in the industry profit that will eventually be generated.
39 A stable profit profile* of the latter setup is obtained as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of no commitment framework, since allowing for renegotiation from scratch of the first agreement with D1 in case of a failure of negotiation with D2 constitutes a sufficient amount of renegotiations. *A stable profit profile is a set of profit pairs {πU , πi} such that Di cannot improve its payoff in a pairwise renegotiation with U without lowering U 's payoff and U cannot improve its payoff in a pairwise renegotiation with Di without lowering Di's payoff.
As a result, the bilateral incentives of U and D 1 coincide with maximizing the total industry profit.
When the firstly signed contract has no commitment power, U and D 1 do not have any incentives to distort the efficient outcome, since they cannot shift rent from the second retailer by manipulating their first contract. Given that U and D 1 set their variable tariff inducing the monopoly price, t 1 (q M 1 ) = R 1 (q M 1 , q M 2 ), U and D 2 prefer to induce the monopoly price, too, since their bilateral profit is increasing in the industry profit (from (3)). This gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In any candidate equilibrium of the game with renegotiation from scratch, if both retailers sign a contract, the first contracting parties set t 1 (q M 1 ) = R 1 (q M 1 , q M 2 ), and thereby induce the quantities maximizing the industry profit,
Now the question is whether the contracting parties would deviate from this candidate equilibrium to any exclusive dealing outcome. To answer this question, we need to characterize the candidate equilibrium payoffs and check whether any party might want to break its deal to get its corresponding outside option. The following condition is crucial in determining the equilibrium payoffs:
Condition (P 1) holds if and only if the second retailer has sufficiently low bargaining power:
in which case I show that in equilibrium the gains from trade between U and D 2 is positive, and thus D 2 earns positive profits as long as it has some bargaining power, λ 2 > 0. Otherwise, that is, if λ 2 > λ 2 , D 2 has very high bargaining power, but it gets zero, since then D 1 and U shift all rent from D 2 .
Intuitively, if U finds dealing exclusively with D 2 (and thus getting (1 − λ 2 )Π m 2 ) more profitable than dealing exclusively with D 1 (and getting (1−λ 1 )Π m 1 ), (P 1) holds and D 2 earns positive profits given that λ 2 > 0. The next result characterizes the equilibrium profits:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, both retailers are active and a negative up-front fee in the first contract and a fixed fee in the second contract are used to share the monopoly profit.
• If (P 1) holds, i.e., λ 2 < λ 2 ,
which lead to
• If (P 1) does not hold, i.e., λ 2 ≥ λ 2 , S * *
Observe that a negative up-front payment, that is, a slotting fee paid by U to D 1 , at the signature of the first contract is a means to achieve the vertically integrated monopoly outcome as long as D 1 has some bargaining power: Negative S * * 1 allows U and D 1 to share their bilateral profit once they set t * * 1 (q M 1 ) = R 1 (q M 1 , q M 2 ). In the second contract, it does not make a difference whether there is a conditional and/or an up-front fee since the first contract has been agreed upon when the second contract is negotiated, so there is no need to protect the second retailer against any opportunism.
Hence, the sum of fees t * * 2 (q M 2 ) + S * * 2 are used to share the bilateral profits between U and D 2 .
To sum up, I show that the commitment strategic effects are avoided by renegotiation from scratch of the first agreement in the event of the second retailer leaving the game. To illustrate further the role of the first contract's commitment power, I next consider the partial commitment scenario.
Partial commitment: contracts with renegotiation, but not from scratch
Consider the framework where the first contracting parties could renegotiate their contract in the event of the second retailer being out of the game. Different from the no commitment case, here I assume that renegotiation is from the status quo which is given by the payoffs under the firstly signed contract, T 1 :
Hence, these payoffs determine the respective outside options of U and D 1 in renegotiation.
They would like to renegotiate a new contract as long as they could improve their bilateral profit. When q * 1 = q m 1 , they renegotiate a new contract, say T m 1 , inducing q m 1 and thereby leading to the maximum bilateral profit, Π m 1 . Their payoffs from renegotiation would then be
To take into account this difference in the solution of the game, it is enough to replace
in the analysis of the benchmark analysis. Now, the bilateral profit of U and D 1 is
which can be re-written (by replacing the value of π * 1 U (T m 1 ) from (14) and (13)) as
which illustrates that U and D 1 face exactly the same trade-off as in the benchmark. On one hand, they want to induce (q M 1 , q M 2 ) to maximize the industry profit. This requires setting
. On the other hand, when the second retailer has some bargaining power, λ 2 > 0, they want to minimize the rent of the second retailer by setting q * 1 = q m 1 and t 1 (q * 1 ) = R 1 (q * 1 , 0). This proves that the equilibrium with partial commitment is the same as the equilibrium with full commitment. The next question is whether the first contracting firms prefer signing vertical contracts which have no commitment power (until retail competition takes place) to the contracts with full commitment.
Preferences over the commitment power of the first contract
Recall that the game without renegotiation could attain three different equilibrium outcomes:
1. Exclusive dealing with the second retailer, in which case the bilateral profit of U and
2. Both retailers are active, in which case the bilateral profit of U and D 1 would be (from 9)
3. Exclusive dealing with the first retailer, in which case the bilateral profit of U and D 1 would be Π m 1 .
However, if U and D 1 write in their contract that it is going to be null and renegotiated from scratch if the second retailer is out of the game, their bilateral profit is given by Proposition 3. To analyze whether they want to have such a renegotiation clause in their contract, I compare their ex-post bilateral profits under the three frameworks: no commitment, partial commitment, and full commitment.
Proposition 4 The first contracting parties are indifferent between contracting with renegotiation (but not from scratch) and without renegotiation, but they prefer contracting with renegotiation from scratch to the others if the second retailer has sufficiently high bargaining power:
When D 2 has sufficiently high bargaining power (for high enough λ 2 ) and/or D 1 is sufficiently profitable in exclusive dealing (for high enough (1 − λ 1 )Π m 1 ) and/or when the retailers are sufficiently differentiated (when Π m 1 + Π m 2 − Π M is very small), the sufficient condition holds, and so the first retailer and manufacturer prefer the outcome of the game with renegotiation from scratch (no commitment) to the game without renegotiation (full commitment). Intuitively, in those cases, incentives to shift rent from D 2 are very high, so the first contracting parties prefer their contract to have no commitment power in case D 2 has no agreement.
3.5 Are slotting fees necessary? Miklós-Thal et al. (2010) show that negative payments, that is, slotting fees, are not necessary to achieve the fully integrated monopoly outcome when the retailers make simultaneous offers to the manufacturer and these offers could be contingent on the market structure, exclusive dealing vs common agency. In their framework, retailer i gets at most its contribution to the efficient outcome, Π M − Π m −i , and this profit could be ensured if the manufacturer sells a limited quantity at cost to the retailer. They prove that, under some conditions, 40 this quantity level lies below the monopoly quantity, and thereby a slotting fee could be replaced by selling a limited volume at cost to leave each retailer its contribution.
In equilibrium of my setup, the first contracting retailer gets (see Proposition 3):
which could be more than its contribution to the industry outcome, Π M − Π m 2 , if the second retailer has sufficiently high bargaining power:
in which case the manufacturer has to sell a greater quantity at cost, which might not be below the monopoly quantity. Intuitively, when the second retailer has very high bargaining power, the first contracting parties could shift a significant amount of rent from the second retailer. To share their bilateral profit, the manufacturer would need to sell at cost a volume greater than the monopoly quantity, but then this contract could not implement the monopoly outcome. Therefore, the slotting fee of the first contract cannot be replaced by a limited volume at cost. Hence, when the second retailer has sufficiently high bargaining power, a slotting fee in the first contract becomes a necessary tool to share the profits and thereby to implement the monopoly outcome. In this case, banning slotting fees would lead to the opportunism problem of the monopoly manufacturer and thereby result in some competitive prices or exclusion of the second retailer (if it has very high bargaining power). Hence, the welfare implications of slotting fees are unclear; they might prevent the monopoly prices, but at the same time, they might lead to the exclusion of one retailer.
On the other hand, when the second contracting retailer does not have so much bargaining power, a slotting fee is sufficient but not necessary to share the profits and can be replaced by a limited volume at cost, like in Miklós-Thal et al. (2010) In this case, banning slotting fees would not affect the final outcome.
40 More precisely, each retailer's contribution to the industry profit should decrease in its rival's quantity, ∂q −i Ri < 0, which is the case by A1 in my paper, and the retailers' quantities should be strategic substitutes.
21
4 Extensions 4.1 Renegotiation from scratch in case of a success or failure of the second negotiation:
Now, suppose that U and D 1 are allowed to renegotiate from scratch the first agreement should the second negotiation succeed (that is, they renegotiate from scratch if and only if they mutually agree to do so, otherwise the first contract is in force). In this case, D 2 should also be protected against any opportunism when U possibly renegotiates afterwards with
, U and D 2 prefer to achieve the maximum industry profit (by the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2). To do so, in addition to q 2 = q M 2 , they also need to set t 2 (q M 2 ) = R 2 (q M 2 , q M 1 ) to protect D 2 against the opportunism of U . But then, U and D 1 will not have any incentive to trade a quantity different than q M 1 . Moreover, the equilibrium fee S * * 1 is ex-post optimal since it implements the optimal sharing rule between U and D 1 expecting the fully-integrated monopoly profit. Hence, U and D 1 do not mutually agree to renegotiate equilibrium contract T * * 1 if the second negotiation succeeds. (exchanging the roles between D 1 and D 2 ). Symmetric to (P 1), the following condition will be crucial in determining equilibrium payoffs:
The order of sequential negotiations
Proposition 5 If U negotiates first with D 2 , in equilibrium with renegotiation from scratch, both retailers are active and implement the fully integrated monopoly outcome. The equilibrium payoffs can be of two types: If (P 2) holds, all parties get some positive profits as long as they have some bargaining power. Otherwise, D 1 gets 0 whereas D 2 gets the fully integrated monopoly profit after leaving U its outside option.
The order of the sequential negotiations does not affect the equilibrium quantities, which are always at the monopoly level, and only affects the distribution of the monopoly profit. Now I add one stage at the beginning of the game, in which U decides with which retailer to negotiate first. Comparing U 's payoff when D 1 is the first negotiating retailer with U 's payoff when D 2 is the first negotiating retailer, gives us the following result:
Proposition 6 In the game with renegotiation from scratch, U prefers to negotiate first with the retailer with which it gets the smaller payoff when there is exclusive dealing, that is, if Intuitively, U wants to take advantage of a greater outside option in the first negotiation. This is similar to the finding of Marx and Shaffer (2007a) in an inverse industry structure where a common agent retailer prefers to negotiate first with the weaker supplier to improve its bargaining position at the first stage. 41
Comparing the profit of D 1 when it is the first negotiator (given in Proposition 3) and when it is the second (given in the proof of Proposition 6), one can show that D 1 always prefers to be the first in negotiations (and, by symmetry, the same is true for D 2 ). When (P1) does not hold, D 1 gets the maximum industry profit if it is the first contracting retailer, so, in this case, it is straightforward that D 1 prefers to be the first. However, in this case, we 
Timing of the manufacturer's production
I assume that the manufacturer produces after the contract negotiations terminate. If the manufacturer produced before contract negotiations and its production is observable to the retailers, it would use its investment in the capacity of a tool to commit to selling the vertically integrated monopoly quantity after selling the half monopoly quantity to the first retailer, that is, the manufacturer could commit to not being opportunistic against the first retailer.
The fact that production takes place before contracting would not change the commitment strategic effects of the first contract on the manufacturer's outside option in the second negotiation. Ex-ante investment in capacity by the manufacturer would lead to retail competition in quantities. Hence, without renegotiation, the first contracting parties would want to trade less than the monopoly quantity distorting the industry profit to shift rent from the second retailer (the result of Proposition 1 when the quantities are strategic substitutes). Different from the original setup, here there is an additional commitment effect due to the investment in capacity and this effect would not be removed by a renegotiation clause. Even if the first contract is renegotiated from scratch in the event of the second retailer has no agreement, the industry outcome would be inefficient due to the capacity constraint. However, if one allows for production also after the first contract negotiation, renegotiation of the first contract from scratch would lead to extra production should the second retailer leaves the game. This means that the first contract's quantity would not affect the manufacturer's outside option in the second negotiation and therefore the first contracting parties would want to trade the efficient quantity.
To account for the positive marginal cost of production, I assume that the manufacturer's production occurs after the retailers order their quantities. This assumption is not critical to my results. Relaxing it and assuming that the manufacturer produces before the retailers' orders would make the manufacturer's marginal cost sunk when it sells to the retailers, but would not change my results qualitatively. Instead, this would correspond to a special case of my framework where the manufacturer's marginal cost is zero.
Contingent contracts
If the contracts were allowed to be contingent on the rival's contract, or simply on its existence, like in Miklós-Thal et al. (2010) , the firms would achieve the efficient outcome without renegotiation. By setting the following contract:
and D 2 has a contract Π M + cq m 1 if q = q m 1 and D 2 has no contract ∞ otherwise , the first contracting parties would maximize their joint profit, (6), through implementing the monopoly outcome and capturing all rent of the second retailer simultaneously. This contract claims to charge the first retailer more than the industry profit in case D 2 has no agreement, that is, Π M + cq m 1 > Π m 1 . If this is not possible, for example, due to limited liability, the first contracting parties could not shift all the rent of D 2 , but would still be able to implement the monopoly quantities by setting t 1 (q m 1 ) = R 1 (q m 1 , 0) in case D 2 has no contract. Intuitively, when the first contract could be contingent on common agency (where both retailers are active) vs exclusivity (where D 2 has no contract), the contingency eliminates the commitment strategic effects of the common agency tariff, since it allows the first contracting parties to control the rent of the second retailer through the exclusive dealing tariff.
Policy implications and concluding remarks
Policy makers have increasingly been concerned about how retailers' bargaining strength visa-vis suppliers affects less powerful retailers and final prices. 43 The exercise of retailers' buyer power has given rise to many (complex) forms of payments made by suppliers to retailers, e.g., "slotting fees" to place products on the retailers' shelves, many "types of variable promotional support and any overriders that are linked to volume of sales, including growth targets." 44 Retailers get variable volume discounts at realized quantities of sales, whereas slotting fees are paid before the good is actually purchased and "do not commit the store operator to any particular level of purchases." 45 In other words, after receiving a slotting fee from a producer, the retailer could choose not to buy the product.
My analysis of supply contracts with full commitment shows that when competing retailers have some bargaining power vis-à-vis a common manufacturer, sequential bilateral negotiations of contracts would result in competitive prices or an exclusion of one retailer due to contracting externalities, even if contracts are general enough to solve the opportunism problem of the manufacturer. Different from Marx and Shaffer (2007b) , who show that non-renegotiable simultaneous offers by retailers lead to the exclusion of the less "profitable" retailer, I show that one retailer might be excluded in equilibrium, but the occurrence of exclusion does not necessarily depend on the relative profitability of the retailers. For instance, the second contracting retailer is excluded if it has sufficiently high bargaining power.
Moreover, I show that a simple renegotiation clause in bilateral contracts (that is, contracts with no commitment) would enable the firms to internalize all contracting externalities and implement the fully integrated monopoly prices, where both retailers are active.
Regarding the welfare implications of slotting fees, I show that a slotting fee in the first contract might be necessary to implement the monopoly outcome, since it cannot be replaced by non-negative tariffs, like sales at cost, to share the bilateral profits between the first contracting parties if the second retailer has a very high bargaining power. This result is different from Miklós-Thal et al. (2010) , who show that slotting fees are sufficient, but not necessary tools to implement the monopoly outcome.
Instead of giving all bargaining power to one side, I assume more realistic bilateral negotiations where bargaining power is shared between the two sides. This allows me to analyze exclusive dealing incentives in the game without renegotiation and illustrate differences from Marx and Shaffer (2007b) when the retailers have asymmetric bargaining power. This also alleviates some problems that might otherwise arise when two competitors make take-it-orleave-it offers to the same partner. In equilibrium, the side with no bargaining power gets zero, so the competitors could always find a profitable deviation from any candidate equilibrium by offering a slightly positive payoff to the common agent. 46 Allowing for more balanced bargaining power is likely to ensure that all parties strictly prefer to deal with all partners and thus simplify the existence and the characterization of equilibria.
An interesting research agenda is to extend this analysis to account for implications of Exclusive dealing equilibrium without renegotiation Consider the equilibrium of the game without renegotiation. The first contracting parties prefer to exclude the second retailer if and only if they earn more from exclusive dealing and more than their joint profits in case of a disagreement, that is, conditions in (10) both hold.
Suppose that the industry profit when both retailers are active is at least as high as the exclusive dealing profits, Π(q * * 1 , q * * 2 ) ≥ max {Π m 1 , Π m 2 }. Indeed, when the retailers are highly differentiated and are not very asymmetric in their profitability, this inequality should hold.
Let λ 2 denote the minimum threshold at which both conditions in (10) 
Observe that (15) always holds since the sum of the last two terms in the brackets (on the right-hand side) sum up to the manufacturer's exclusive dealing profit with D 1 , which is non-negative:
D 1 , and once T * * 1 is signed, it has no incentive to fail its negotiation with D 2 , either. Similarly, as both retailers get non-negative payoffs under contracts (T * * 1 , T * * 2 ), none of them has an incentive to fail its negotiation with U . Hence, in equilibrium both retailers are active and implement the fully integrated monopoly outcome, and the equilibrium payoffs of two types depending on condition (P 1). 
Proof of Proposition 4
This could be an equilibrium if and only if it dominates the exclusive dealing outcomes:
Suppose that this is the case (since otherwise U and D 1 would prefer renegotiation from scratch to the game without renegotiation). First observe that the bilateral profit in the game with renegotiation is bounded above:
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